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Tax Evasion Confusion in the Ninth Circuit
by Prof. Kim Stanley, Golden Gate University School of Law

It is well settled that the crime of tax evasion under IRC §7201 has three
fundamental elements. The statute requires the government to prove (1) the existence of
a tax deficiency, (2) willfulness in the attempted evasion of taxes, and (3) an affirmative
act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion.1 However, two recent Ninth Circuit tax
evasion cases have muddied the waters – resulting in opposite outcomes – and have tax
practitioners questioning the court’s reasoning.
In the first case, United States v. Boulware, 2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s tax evasion conviction even though the district court refused to instruct the
jury that the funds he diverted from his small corporation might not constitute a taxable
dividend under IRC § 301 if the corporation lacked earnings and profits. If the diverted
funds were not taxable to Boulware as a dividend, his failure to report the income was not
fraudulent and would not create a tax deficiency, essential elements supporting the
government’s tax evasion charge. This case is on its way to the US Supreme Court,
which granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari in September 2007.
In the second case, United States v. Kayser,3 the defendant again complained of a
faulty jury instruction, but this time the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his tax evasion
conviction. The court ruled in Kayser that the district court should have instructed the
jury that business deductions the defendant claimed on his corporation’s tax return
instead might have been used to eliminate his unreported individual taxable income.
Consequently, the court ruled that the government fell short of establishing that the
defendant had a tax deficiency and did not meet its burden of proving each of the
elements of tax evasion under IRC § 7201. The common question in both cases: may a
person defend against a tax evasion charge by arguing that he might have owed no tax at
all had he reported the transaction differently? By answering “no” in Boulware and “yes”
in Kayser, the Ninth Circuit’s confused and irreconcilable analysis does not withstand
scrutiny.
United States v. Boulware
Michael Boulware was the founder, president, and sole owner of a closely held
corporation, Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (“HIE”).4 By 1985, HIE had a number of
business ventures that included tobacco distribution, coffee processing and sales, arcade
games and vending machines, and was reporting gross receipts of over $55 million. 5
Boulware was indicted for tax evasion, among other crimes, on the Government’s claim
that he had diverted to himself more than $10 million from HIE and failed to report or
pay tax on this income for years 1989 through 1997. 6 Boulware was convicted on the
four counts of tax evasion and appealed.7 On the first appeal of his conviction, the Ninth
Circuit reversed because the district court erroneously excluded evidence that a Hawaii
state court had adjudicated Boulware’s rights in certain funds diverted from HIE.
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On retrial, Boulware raised a new argument – the so-called “return of capital”
defense. Boulware wanted to put on expert testimony to explain to the jury that the
money he diverted from HIE might not constitute his personal taxable income if the funds
were a return of his capital investment in the corporation. Under IRC § 301, if a
corporation has no current or accumulated earnings and profits for the taxable year in
which a distribution is made to a shareholder, the distribution is not treated as a taxable
dividend. Rather, the distribution is characterized as a nontaxable return of the
shareholder’s basis in his stock of the corporation, and any distribution in excess of the
shareholder’s stock basis is treated as capital gain from the sale or exchange of the stock.8
Similarly, IRC § 316 defines a dividend as any distribution by a corporation to a
shareholder “out of its earnings and profits.” Boulware argued that the jury should be
instructed that if HIE did not have earnings and profits during the year he diverted the
funds, the funds would have been a nontaxable return of his capital investment. In such
circumstances, he argued that his failure to report the diverted corporate funds as taxable
income was not fraudulent because the diversion would not have created a tax deficiency,
thus eliminating an essential element of the crime for which he was charged.
The district court, however, refused to allow Boulware to introduce evidence
concerning the return of capital defense. Citing United States v. Miller,9 the district court
ruled that Boulware had to show not only that the funds he diverted from HIE could have
been a nontaxable return of capital, but also that they were, in fact, intended to be a return
of capital at the time of the transfer. Since Boulware did not proffer evidence tending to
establish that the corporation’s records reflected the distribution of funds as a return of
capital, the court rejected his instruction. He was again convicted on all counts.10 On
appeal of his second conviction to the Ninth Circuit, Boulware argued that the district
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the return of capital defense. The Ninth
Circuit concluded there was no reversible error and affirmed his conviction.11
a.

The return of capital defense

The Ninth Circuit did not write on a blank slate in Boulware. The return of
capital defense has long been recognized in civil tax cases; courts agree that under IRC
§301 a distribution of corporate funds are taxable income to the shareholder only to the
extent the corporation had earnings and profits during the year in which the distribution
occurred.12 Although the federal courts of appeal disagree about the use of the return of
capital defense in criminal tax evasion cases, the Ninth Circuit had addressed the issue in
its 1976 opinion United States v. Miller. 13 The defendant in Miller was convicted of tax
evasion for diverting $197,000 from a small corporation he controlled. On appeal, Miller
argued that the diverted funds, although not reported as his income, did not cause a tax
deficiency because the corporation lacked earnings and profits during the year he diverted
the funds.14 Characterizing this defense as “an extremely technical argument,”15 the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the corporation “was not shown to have had any
earnings and profits during the period under consideration.” 16 However, the court
explained that even if Miller’s return of capital defense were accepted, by his own
admission he still would have had a tax deficiency of $1,699 long term capital gain,
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which was, in the court’s view, “substantial enough” to support a tax evasion conviction
under IRC § 7201. 17
Nevertheless, the Miller court went on to discuss whether the corporate funds
Miller diverted were taxable as income or were a return of his capital investment in the
corporation.18 Starting from the shaky premise that it is normally “relatively
unimportant” in a tax evasion case to characterize the nature of diverted funds “since the
primary question is not the amount of the evasion but whether the taxpayer intended to
evade and defeat his taxes,”19 the Ninth Circuit confirmed that this characterization was
“more critical” in Miller because “there are no corporate earnings and profits from which
a dividend could be paid.”20 The court conceded that “[i]f the corporation has no
earnings and profits and if the taxpayer’s cost basis of the stock exceeds the amount of
the diverted funds, the application of the constructive distribution rules . . . would permit
the taxpayer to escape conviction . . . .” 21 The court was obviously troubled by the
anomaly that Miller could be found guilty of willfully attempting to evade taxes (by
engaging in fraudulent activities and hiding the diverted funds on corporate records as
nontaxable loan repayments) but that, due to an “after-the-fact categorization” of the
diverted funds as a return of capital, he could escape a tax evasion conviction because the
diverted funds were taxable as a dividend due to the lack of corporate earnings and
profits.22
Ultimately, the Miller court held that the constructive distribution rules of IRC
§301 could be applied in tax evasion cases, but not “automatically.”23 The court felt the
primary focus in a tax evasion case should be whether the defendant willfully intended to
evade taxes by diverting corporate funds, rather than the nature or characterization of the
diverted funds –
Where the taxpayer has sought to conceal income by filing a false return,
he has violated the tax evasion statutes. It does not matter that that
amount could have somehow been made nontaxable if the taxpayer had
proceeded on a different course. [fn. omitted] To apply the constructive
distribution rules to this situation would nullify all of the taxpayer’s prior
unlawful acts. 24
The Ninth Circuit in Miller left open the door for a tax evasion defendant to raise a return
of capital defense where there is “some demonstration on the part of the taxpayer and/or
the corporation that such distributions were intended to be such a return.”25 (Emphasis
added.) In a footnote, the court further explained that once a taxpayer assumes control of
diverted corporate funds he commits the crime of tax evasion if he fails to report the
funds as income or fails to “make any adjustments in the corporate books to reflect a
return of capital . . . .”26 Because defendant Miller “presented no concrete proof that the
amounts were considered, intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of
capital at the time they were made,” the court held that it had no factual basis on which to
conclude that they were nontaxable corporate distributions. 27
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The Miller decision represents a “middle of the road” position. A majority of
circuits (Eleventh, Sixth, and Third) now require the government in a criminal tax evasion
case to prove only that the taxpayer had “actual command” over the diverted corporate
funds; whether corporate earnings and profits existed in the year the defendant diverted
the funds is wholly irrelevant.28 In contrast, the Second Circuit allows defendants in both
civil and criminal cases involving diverted corporate funds to raise the return of capital
defense.29 In rejecting the reasoning of the other circuits, the court explained that if all
the government must do to prove criminal tax evasion is to show that a taxpayer had
“actual command” over diverted corporate funds and took affirmative acts to evade
paying taxes, the government no longer has to prove the existence of a tax deficiency,
thereby eliminating that element of the crime under § 7201.30 In such situations, the
government would bear a higher burden of proof in a civil tax matter – in which diverted
funds are taxable only on a showing that there were corporate earnings and profits -- than
in a criminal tax evasion prosecution, clearly a nonsensical result.31 The Second Circuit’s
conclusion is straightforward -- “[t]he diversion of the funds cannot constitute a criminal
offense, despite criminal intent, if no taxes are due.”32 For these reasons, the Second
Circuit allows a criminal defendant to raise lack of corporate earnings and profits as a
defense in criminal tax evasion cases, provided the diversion of funds itself was lawful.33
The court expressly disagreed with Miller that a tax evasion defendant must establish that
diverted funds were intended to be treated as a return of capital34 -[I]n return of capital cases, a taxpayer’s intent is not determinative in
defining the taxpayer’s conduct. That is, the taxpayer or the corporation
need not have described the distribution at issue as a dividend or a return
of capital at the time it was made; rather, the realities of the transaction –
including the amount of the shareholder’s basis and the corporation’s
earnings and profits, as well as the amount of the distribution – govern its
characterization for tax purposes.35
b.

Boulware’s limitation on the return of capital defense

In Boulware, the defendant wanted to put on expert testimony to explain that the
funds he diverted might not constitute taxable income if they were a loan repayment, or
used by him for corporate purposes, or if HIE had insufficient earnings and profits to
characterize the funds as constructive dividend distributions under IRC § 301. The
district court ruled, however, that his offer of proof failed Miller’s threshold – he must
show not merely that the funds could have been a nontaxable return of capital, but that
they were, in fact, intended to be a return of capital at the time of the transfer.36 On
appeal, Boulware renewed the argument that applying Miller’s intent requirement
“creates a disconnect” between civil and criminal tax liability by allowing a criminal
conviction in the absence of proof that the unreported diversion of corporate funds caused
a tax deficiency.37 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, however, holding that it was bound by
Miller, and that the district court properly had required Boulware to first lay a factual
foundation that the diverted amounts “were considered, intended, or recorded on the
corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were made.” 38 The court
reiterated the Miller rationale that --
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[w]here the taxpayer has sought to conceal income by filing a false return,
he has violated the tax evasion statutes. It does not matter that the amount
could have somehow been made non-taxable if the taxpayer had
proceeded on a different course. 39
In a concurring opinion, Judge Thomas stated that the court’s decision, while consistent
with Miller, allows a defendant to be “criminally sanctioned for tax evasion without
owing a penny in taxes to the government,” which was, in his view, “in flat contradiction
with the tax evasion statute’s requirement of ‘the existence of a tax deficiency.’”40
United States v. Kayser
Following a few months after its opinion in Boulware, the Ninth Circuit was again
faced with whether Miller precluded a criminal tax evasion defendant from instructing
the jury that he might not have had a tax deficiency if he had alternatively characterized
his income or expenses. In United States v. Kayser, 41 the Ninth Circuit agreed that
Miller did not preclude a defendant from reporting his income and deductions in one way
and then arguing for an alternative characterization at trial, and reversed the conviction.
In Kayser, the taxpayer worked as an independent contractor for an internet
shopping site, and incorporated a small corporation to receive the income he earned and
claim business deductions. The government alleged that Kayser had received $104,000
of income in 1999 that should have been reported on his individual return; Kayser,
however, reported that income on his corporate return. For 2000, the government
established that Kayser failed to report his earnings on either his individual or corporate
returns, but he did report some $49,026 of business deductions on his 2000 corporate
return. 42 These business deductions created a net operating loss for the corporation in
2000 which he carried back and used to eliminate the corporation’s taxable income he
had reported for 1999.43
Kayser was indicted on two counts of attempted income tax evasion for 1999 and
2000 under IRC § 7201. At trial, Kayser argued that he had not willfully evaded paying
taxes, and that the income he failed to report on his individual return for 2000 should
have been offset by the $49,026 in business deductions he claimed, erroneously he now
argued, on his 2000 corporate tax return. Kayser’s accountant testified that the expenses
were typical business expenses actually incurred in 2000 and were substantiated by
Kayser’s books and records. Kayser requested a jury instruction that if he had
“unclaimed deductions which would have offset his tax liability such that there was no
tax due and owing, then there is no tax deficiency.” 44 The district court declined to give
this instruction, holding that Kayser had not introduced evidence that he had any
previously “unclaimed deductions,” and that, under Miller, he could not use the
deductions he already had reported on his corporate return to negate his individual tax
deficiency.45 The jury found Kayser guilty of tax evasion for 2000 but failed to reach a
verdict on the tax evasion charge for 1999.46
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Kayser’s conviction on the ground the jury
should have been instructed that the $49,026 in business deductions he had reported on
his corporate return might have been used to offset his unreported individual income in
2000.47 Beginning with the well recognized rule that a defendant in a tax evasion case
may negate the existence of a tax deficiency with evidence of unreported deductions,48
the court held that Kayser was entitled to demonstrate at trial that his deductions could
have offset his unreported individual taxable income, even though that position was
inconsistent with his own tax reporting which had used the same deductions to offset his
corporation’s taxable income.49 Neither Miller nor Boulware precluded this result, in the
court’s view. To the contrary, the court offered that Miller’s return of capital defense
failed only because the factual evidence supported the district court’s finding that the
diverted funds were additional taxable salary rather than a loan repayment (as reported on
the corporate books) or other nontaxable return of capital.50 The court concluded that
“[t]he import of our holding in Miller is that a defendant remains free to present evidence
that funds diverted from a corporation are a non-taxable return of capital, regardless of
the manner in which he or the corporation originally reported the transaction.” 51
The court also distinguished Boulware, stating in a footnote that it “did not
conclude that Boulware was bound by the manner in which he originally reported the
transaction,” or that Boulware could not introduce evidence to support his return of
capital defense. 52 “Rather,” the court continued, “we held that under Miller, Boulware
was required to show that the distribution was intended to be a return of capital,” and that
the evidence he proffered did not establish that the diverted funds “were considered,
intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were
made . . . .”53 The court summed up its holding in Kayser as follows –
[W]e hold that if Kayser had business expenses that were allowable offsets
against his individual income, he had the right to show them and explain
them as part of his defense for tax evasion. . . . The fact that Kayser
improperly reported the deductions he now claims negate his individual
deficiency . . . does not alter our conclusion. Kayser’s improper report of
deductions on his corporate return does not change the underlying nature
of these expenses . . . .” 54
In a biting dissent, Judge Kozinski stated that the majority’s holding in Kayser
“jumped the rails” and was not only without support but in conflict with the Court’s
rulings in Miller and Boulware.55 In his view, the majority erred because Kayser did not
have “unused” deductions to offset his unreported income for 2000 – he had already used
the $49,026 in business deductions to entirely eliminate his corporation’s 1999 taxable
income. Thus, the case was unlike those where the defendants had failed to report
allowable business deductions and so were not bound by any prior use or characterization
of the deficiency-eliminating deductions. 56
Moreover, the majority was, in the dissent’s view, completely at odds with Miller
and Boulware because neither defendant was allowed to argue for a nontaxable
characterization of the funds unless the distributions were reflected as such in the
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corporation’s records. Thus, even though the defendants could later claim, as a matter of
“economic reality,” that the distribution was a return of capital, the court ruled it “was of
no consequence, because contemporaneously maintained records did not support that recharacterization.”57 The dissent reiterated that the Court’s ruling opened the door for a
defendant to be criminally convicted for tax evasion regardless whether he owed any
taxes. Unlike Boulware, the dissent emphasized that Kayser did not hold the defendant to
the manner in which he “papered” the transaction58 -The same deductions cannot be used twice: He can either use them to wipe
out his 2000 personal income or he can carry them back to wipe out his
1999 corporate income. Having chosen to do the latter when he filed his
returns, the deductions are used up and are not available to offset his 2000
personal income. Contrary to the majority’s holding . . . Kayser does not
have allowable deductions that were not reported on his return. Even if
the deductions in question could have been treated as personal deductions,
had Kayser claimed them as such on his individual return, the district
court properly concluded that Kayser is stuck with the way he reported
them at the time – which was as corporate deductions. To let him now go
back and treat the deductions as applicable to his personal income allows
for precisely the kind of heads-I-win, tails-the-government-loses scenario
that Miller sought to foreclose.
Is form controlling substance?
One strains to reconcile the Ninth Circuit’s recent tax evasion rulings because the
court first exalts form over substance in Boulware, and then completely ignores it in
Kayser. Certainly the court understands that for a person to be liable for the crime of tax
evasion under IRC § 7201, the government must prove not only that the defendant
engaged in fraudulent behavior with an intention to evade his taxes, but that he actually
had a tax liability to evade. If it turns out, after the fact, that notwithstanding his
fraudulent behavior the defendant for some legitimate reason has no civil tax liability,
there is no basis for a tax evasion conviction. The court got it wrong in both Boulware
and Kayser.
Boulware acknowledges that its holding allows a conviction for tax evasion
without proof there was a civil tax liability, but deflects by stating that result is mandated
by Miller.59 In Miller, the court indeed opined that “it [didn’t] matter” that a tax evasion
defendant’s civil tax liability “could have somehow been made non-taxable if the
taxpayer had proceeded on a different course,”60 but was dealing with a defendant that
conceded he would have a tax deficiency even with the return of capital defense. While
one certainly cannot condone acts that are intended to defraud the government, the fact
remains that the crime of tax evasion requires that those fraudulent activities result in the
evasion of a tax that is actually owed. If the taxpayer can establish that despite fraudulent
acts he does not owe any taxes, such as through unused deductions or credits, he has not
committed the crime of tax evasion, as the courts have always acknowledged and the
statute mandates.
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Boulware holds that a tax evasion defendant may raise the return of capital
defense only if there is contemporaneous evidence that the corporation intended the
diversion of funds to be characterized as a return of the shareholder’s capital investment.
No after-the-fact or technical arguments that the funds are somehow nontaxable will
suffice. Yet this adherence to the form of the transaction is unusual in taxation – perhaps
even unheard of. Particularly where, as here, it is the lack of form – i.e., any corporate
indication that the funds were intended to be a return of capital – that has bound the
taxpayer. If in substance the funds would not have constituted taxable income, and the
taxpayer can prove that, it should not matter how the corporation papered the transaction.
Indeed, there is no requirement that a corporation have or record any “intention”
regarding a distribution of funds to a shareholder. (And if that were the test, it certainly
would be an easy thing for sole shareholders such as Boulware or Kayser to make such a
recording on their corporate books.) Rather, the characterization of the funds in the
hands of the shareholder as taxable or nontaxable is mandated by statute and turns on the
objective existence of corporate earnings and profits, not on some subjective corporate
“intention.” The court’s refusal to allow Boulware to put on evidence that HIE lacked
earnings and profits precluded him from refuting an essential element of the charge
against him. The court’s distinction that the characterization of the funds for civil tax
purposes under § 301 is irrelevant in a criminal tax case is nonsensical because it is the
existence of a civil tax deficiency that is an essence of the crime.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Kayser acknowledged that substance governs
form and that an asserted tax liability (as part of a criminal tax evasion case) can be
eliminated through after-the-fact tax maneuverings by using otherwise unreported tax
deductions. But in Kayser the form was the substance – the deductions had already been
used in to offset the corporation’s taxable income. While the court acknowledged that
the deductions could not be used twice, the ruling would allow the defendant to shift the
already-used deductions from his corporate return to his personal return. That shift
would have the effect of eliminating his individual tax liability, leaving his fraudulent act
of omitting that income, standing alone, insufficient to support a tax evasion conviction.
Although the deduction shift would have simultaneously created a tax deficiency on the
corporate side, this deficiency arguably would not be sufficient to support a tax evasion
conviction because he had not fraudulently omitted reporting the corporation’s income
that year. In one fell swoop, the court allows the defendant to cover all his sins.
If the court is correct in Kayser that a taxpayer may completely rewrite his tax
return to immunize himself against criminal liability, consistency requires the same in
Boulware. If a taxpayer has diverted corporate funds, but there is evidence that the
corporation had earnings and profits during the year the funds were diverted, the
diversion has not resulted in a tax deficiency and there is no crime. That the corporation
failed to characterize the distribution in a particular manner at the time should not
overcome the clear statutory authority that treats the distribution as a nontaxable return of
capital.
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